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Abstract
In examining the diusion of social and political phenomena like regime transition, conict,
and policy change, scholars routinely make choices about how proximity is dened and which
neighbors should be considered more important than others. Since each specication oers an
alternative view of the networks through which diusion can take place, one's decision can exert
a signicant inuence on the magnitude and scope of estimated diusion eects. This problem is
widely recognized, but is rarely the subject of direct analysis. In international relations research,
connectivity choices are usually ad hoc, driven more by data availability than by theoretically-
informed decision criteria. We take a closer look at the assumptions behind these choices, and
propose a more systematic method to asses the structural similarity of two or more alternative
networks, and select one that most plausibly relates theory to empirics. We apply this method
to the spread of democratic regime change, and oer an illustrative example of how neighbor
choices might impact predictions and inferences in the case of the 2011 Arab Spring.
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1Who are a country's neighbors? On a gut level, the answer might seem obvious: a country's
neighbors are the ones closest to it. Yet choosing an appropriate proximity measure can be a dicult
task, and one which can inuence empirical ndings in decisive ways (Stetzer, 1982; Bavaud, 1998;
Anselin, 2002; Lee, 2009). A growing literature in international relations has highlighted the impor-
tance of geographical proximity to the diusion of social and political phenomena, such as regime
transitions (Starr, 1991; O'Loughlin et al., 1998; Gleditsch and Ward, 2000; Starr and Lindborg,
2003; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006), conict (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002; Salehyan and Gleditsch,
2006; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Gleditsch et al., 2008; Salehyan, 2008), foreign economic poli-
cies (Simmons and Elkins, 2004), bilateral investment treaties (Elkins et al., 2006), defense policies
(Barkley, 2008), government expenditure (Lee and Strang, 2006) and capital taxation (Cao, 2010).1
Most studies dene proximity by shared borders, distances between capitals, or some combination
of the two. Others insist that the connective structure of the international system is not necessarily
geographic, and is based instead on mutual participation in institutions like trade, intergovernmen-
tal organizations and alliances (Cao, 2009; Greenhill et al., 2009; Cao, 2010; Greenhill, 2010; Lazer,
2011; Strebel, 2011). Yet few guidelines exist as to which network specication ts a particular
type of research question, or { once a theoretically appropriate measure is identied { how one's
choice might inuence one's results.
This gap is consequential for both academic research and policy analysis. Diusion has long
been a fundamental concept in foreign policy decision-making: from the \domino theory" of com-
munist expansion during the Cold War, to more recent debates about the spread of democracy in
Eastern Europe, and the potential spillover of protests and revolutions across the Arab world.2 In
order to accurately model and predict these and other diusion processes, it is essential to rst
make sense of what we mean by space, proximity and the connections between states.
In international relations, connectivity choices (what constitutes a neighbor) and spatial weights
(how neighbors aect each other) are often assumed without theoretical justication. The sensi-
tivity of results to these assumptions is widely acknowledged, but most attempts at a systematic
investigation in an international relations context have been limited to dierences within these
choices rather than between them. For instance, there have been several notable studies of sensi-
tivity across dierent distance thresholds or dierent xed numbers of neighbors (O'Loughlin and
Anselin, 1991; Gleditsch and Ward, 2007; Cao, 2010; Pl umper and Neumayer, 2010; Seldadyo et al.,
2010).3 While within-measure sensitivity is important, it becomes relevant only after one answers
1Franzese and Hays have an extremely comprehensive reference list of the political science literature using spatial-
modeling at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/FranzeseHays.Interdependence.IPSA.References.pdf
2The gap is closing; Leeson and Dean (2009) published a recent article re-examining the Democratic Domino
Theory using spatial econometrics.
3It is worth clarifying our contribution in the context of three of these studies. Cao (2010) oers an excellent
applied example of many of the recommendations that we independently developed. He tests the sensitivity of
distance thresholds, and experiments with non-geographic measures of distance in pursuit of his substantive point.
Whereas his focus on taxation is primary with an ancillary focus on general practice, we are primarily interested in
general practice with a substantive example for demonstration purposes. The Gleditsch and Ward (2007) monograph
1more fundamental questions of what topological space the units occupy, how distance is dened on
that space, and what criterion is used to translate these distances into pairwise ties. Each choice
oers a distinct view of the networks through which diusion can take place, and it can be dicult
to assess which specications are interchangeable and which are not. In this paper, we endeavor
to frame the problem, and propose a procedure to adjudicate between competing denitions of
neighborhood. In contrast to the current norm of imposing an arbitrary network specication ex
ante, we recommend a theoretically-informed enumeration of multiple candidates, followed by an
ex post evaluation of their structural similarity and relative statistical and predictive performance.
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we review how diusion has been treated in recent
international relations studies. Second, we introduce the Conicting Neighbor Problem and how
it manifests itself in practice. We then propose a three-step solution to the problem, and apply
it to a reanalysis of a prominent model of democratic diusion (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006) and a
simulation of the 2011 Arab Spring.
1 Diusion in International Relations
There have been two primary applications of spatial data analysis to international relations research.
The rst, and most common, approach has been to relate proximity to the properties of dyads, such
as the level of bilateral trade, cooperation or the incidence and duration of militarized disputes and
other forms of conict. In international political economy, proximity is often used as a component
variable in a gravity model, where bilateral trade ows are modeled as a function of the relative sizes
and distances between two units (Gowa and Manseld, 2004; Goldstein et al., 2007). In international
security, proximity is often incorporated into opportunity/willingness models of conict, where
proximate states are expected to be more willing to go to war with each other, while opportunities to
engage in conict are expected to decline with distance (Siverson and Starr, 1991; Starr and Thomas,
2005). The most frequently used measure of proximity in this literature is border contiguity (Beck
et al., 2000; Lemke and Reed, 2001; Gartzke et al., 2001; Leeds, 2003; Reiter and Stam, 2003; Rasler
and Thompson, 2006), while some studies also include ordinal contiguity \scores" (Slantchev, 2004),
centroid-to-centroid distances (Goldstein et al., 2007) and capital-to-capital distances (Chiozza,
2002; Clark and Regan, 2003; Dorussen, 2006; Krustev, 2006).4 While voluminous, most of this
literature treats geography as a control variable of only secondary theoretical interest.
The second application { and the focus of our current study { is diusion, a concept grounded the
notion that \everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant
provides a very useful reference on the estimation of spatial methods. It however, does not give much practical advice
on the theoretical choices necessary for estimation which is our focus here. Pl umper and Neumayer (2010) provides
an excellent overview of the specication of spatial models. We strongly believe all three of these pieces should be
read in concert by the applied researcher looking to use spatial models.
4The Correlates of War denition of contiguity { the one used most frequently in this literature { provides ve
levels of contiguity: direct land contiguity and four levels of contiguity by water (Stinnett et al., 2002).
2things" (Tobler, 1970). Unlike the dyadic trade and conict literature, diusion studies typically
treat spatial dependence as the quantity of central interest. Here, social and political phenomena
are seen as clustering in space, and the individual characteristics of a state are expected to exhibit
some similarity to those of its neighbors (i.e.: a country located in a democratic region is more likely
to become a democracy than one located in an autocratic region). To estimate the magnitude and
scope of spillover eects, scholars in this eld often employ a spatially lagged dependent variable,
such as the average level of democracy in neighboring states or a binary indicator that at least
one neighbor is experiencing a civil war.5 This eld has been quite heterogeneous in its network
specications: authors have identied neighbors by common borders (Starr and Lindborg, 2003;
Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Barkley, 2008), length of borders (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002), inter-
capital distances (Lee and Strang, 2006; Bach and Newman, 2010), regional xed eects (Pevehouse,
2002), and common borders with a \snap distance," which allows boundary points to be a short
distance from one another rather than directly contiguous (Gleditsch and Ward, 2000, 2006; Beck
et al., 2006; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Gleditsch et al., 2008).
Rarely, however, are neighbor denitions and their respective tuning parameters { such as the
number of neighbors included in the lagged term or the extent of the snap distance { motivated
by theoretical considerations about the networks through which a particular type of diusion takes
place. A theoretically informed choice rests on one's answers to two questions. First, what signal
must be transmitted for a particular type of diusion to take place? For the contagion of civil
war, this might be combatants, ethnic kin or refugees. For the diusion of policy, this might
be information about successful practices or norms. Second, what is the network through which
this signal is most likely to travel? If we assume signals to follow lowest-cost paths, we might
expect weapons trackers to choose illegal border crossing over commercial air travel from capital
to capital, though the opposite may be true for diplomats and activists. Further still, we might
believe that the pathways of certain types of diusion are not geographic at all (Beck et al., 2006).
Any pairwise relationship can in principle be seen as a measure of proximity. Ethic or cultural
ties (Simmons and Elkins, 2004), bilateral trade (Greenhill et al., 2009), joint membership in
intergovernmental organizations (Cao, 2009; Greenhill, 2010), and military alliances (Hammarstrom
and Heldt, 2002) are just four examples among many.6 Some of these networks surely overlap; others
may represent separate and independent pathways. How might one assess the degree of similarity
between these measures, and arbitrate between them in a systematic way?
5A spatially lagged variable is the cross-product of the weights matrix W and a vector of observed values y. It
can be interpreted as a weighted sum of neighboring values.
6For a dierent approach to network methods in IR see Hafner-Burton et al. (2009).
32 The Conicting Neighbor Problem
A network specication is the outcome of three decisions: (1) the choice of a topological space, (2) the
choice of a distance or proximity function dened on that space, and (3) the choice of a connectivity
criterion for the distance metric. The Conicting Neighbor Problem (CNP) lies in the uncertainty
of this network specication process. More than one type of topological space may contain the
same set of objects; more than one distance function may be dened on the same space; more than
one connectivity criterion may be dened for the same distance metric. Even in a relatively simple
applied setting like IR, where the universe of objects is well-dened and the relations between them
well-catalogued, permutations of these three choices are potentially innumerable. This uncertainty
{ and the resulting potential for conict and overlap between specications { can render elusive
the goal of identifying the \true" network of diusion.
Consider a set of n objects, in our case states in the international system. The topological
space S occupied by these objects may be a geographical map, a Cartesian coordinate system, a
network of international trade, or any other set for which a notion of distance between objects
can be dened. Given S, we may dene a distance function d, which satises the following metric
properties for all i;j;k 2 S: d(i;j)  0 (non-negativity), d(i;j) = d(j;i) (symmetry), d(i;i) = 0
(reexivity), and d(i;j)  d(i;k)+d(k;j) (triangular inequality). The distance function d provides
a measure of the \nearness" of two objects situated in space S, such that d(i;j) approaches zero
as two objects move closer together, and innity as they move farther apart. Alternatively, we
may dene a proximity function p(i;j) on S, which approaches innity as two objects move closer
together, and zero as they move farther apart.7 The number of kilometers between capital cities
would be one distance metric in geographical space; the volume of bilateral trade would be a
proximity measure in international economic space.
Connectivity criteria link the distance or proximity functions to some categorical denition of
neighborhood. In a simple thresholding case with search radius r, a connectivity criterion may be
d(i;j) < r (e.g. two countries are connected if the distance between their capitals is less than r km)
or p(i;j) > r (e.g. if the volume of bilateral trade is greater than r dollars). Pairwise connections
between objects are expressed with an nn connectivity matrix C, where a cell c(i;j) = 1 if objects
i and j are \connected" according to some connectivity criterion c, and c(i;j) = 0 otherwise.
The CNP occurs when, for the same pair of objects i;j and two or more network specications
m 2 M, the two objects are considered neighbors under one specication, but not the other.
Given two network specications m = 1;2, their respective graphs are said to be in perfect conict
if c1(i;j) 6= c2(i;j) for all i;j 2 f1;:::;ng, and in perfect agreement if c1(i;j) = c2(i;j) for
all i;j 2 f1;:::;ng. They are in partial conict (or agreement) if both c1(i;j) 6= c2(i;j) and
7Assuming for illustrative purposes a normalized distance bounded by the unit interval 0  d(i;j)  1, we can
dene the relationship between distance d and proximity p as d(i;j) = 1 p(i;j). Although some of the inequalities are
ipped, the same metric space properties obtain as before: p(i;j)  0 (non-negativity), p(i;j) = p(j;i) (symmetry),
p(i;i) = 1 (reexivity), and p(i;j)  p(i;k) + p(k;i)   1 (triangular inequality).
4c1(i;k) = c2(i;k) are true for some i;j;k 2 f1;:::;ng.
Cases of perfect conict and agreement, although rare, are fairly straightforward. In the former,
the graphs constructed from C1 and C2 are complements of each other, as in the case of countries
with and without shared borders, or allied and non-allied relationships. In the latter, the graphs
are isomorphic, and one might be justied in assuming that the specications 1 and 2 represent the
same theoretical concept. In each case, C1 and C2 are highly dependent on one another; knowing
whether a connection exists between i and j in C1 allows us to perfectly predict whether the same
pairwise tie exists in C2. The key dierence lies in the interpretation of spatial dependence. If
two graphs are in perfect conict, positive spatial autocorrelation detected in one graph appears as
negative autocorrelation in the other { diusion becomes repellence, clustering becomes segregation.
Partial conict or agreement are more ambiguous cases. Here, matrices C1 and C2 partially
overlap and represent potentially related networks, though not necessarily ideal substitutes. The
structural similarity between the graphs can vary from very high { approaching that of perfect
conict or agreement { to negligible { where the graphs represent connections in unrelated types of
networks. In IR, most interstructural relationships reside in this murky domain. Border contiguity
may or may not correlate with inter-capital distance, labor migration may or may not correlate
with bilateral trade, and so on. Due to the variety of ways in which connectivities can be specied,
even networks situated in dierent types topological space may be more structurally similar than
those, which share the same space and distance metrics.
3 Finding the \True" Network: A Monte Carlo Study
What are the consequences of the CNP for empirical research? As we demonstrate below us-
ing Monte Carlo simulation, network misspecication can result in biased spatial autocorrelation
estimates, poor model t and inaccurate predictive performance. Use of a specication in partial
conict or agreement with the true graph signicantly increases the risk of Type II errors: a genuine
process of diusion is left undetected. Use of a specication in perfect conict all but guarantees
a Type \S" error (Gelman and Tuerlinckx, 2000): a genuine process of diusion is mistaken for
a process of repellence.8 We propose a three-step method to approach the network specication
process and arbitrate between multiple candidates in a systematic way.
In modeling the process of diusion, the binary graph Cm is typically transformed by row
standardization or some measure of decay into a spatial weight matrix Wm, which governs how
neighbors inuence each other (e.g. competitively, cumulatively, in inverse proportion to distance).
The cross-product of Wm and the dependent variable vector y is the spatial lag Wmy, which
can be interpreted as a weighted sum or average of neighboring values of y. In the simple case
of cross-sectional data with a normally-distributed dependent variable, we can model the diusion
8Gelman and Tuerlinckx (2000, 2) dene Type \S" (for sign) errors as falsely \claiming that 1 > 2 when in fact
2 > 1."
5process with a Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model:
y =mWmy + X +  (1)
=(I   mWm) 1X + (I   mWm) 1 (2)
 =N(0;1)
which resembles an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with the addition of the lagged term
and the spatial autocorrelation coecient m.9 Although many IR applications, including the one
considered below, call for more complex models to accommodate longitudinal data and categorical
dependent variables, the basic intuition is the same. The outcome y is modeled as a function of
the linear predictor on the right side of the equation, which includes outcomes in neighboring units
Wmy, a set of exogenous covariates X and an independent error term .
An underlying assumption of the SAR model is that the matrix Wm captures the one \true"
network of diusion, through which the observed data were generated. In most empirical research,
however, this \true" connective structure is almost always unobserved. Misspecication of this
structure has been shown to generate inconsistent parameter estimates and misleading conclusions
(Anselin, 2002; Fingleton, 2003; Lee, 2009).
Suppose, however, that we have two or more competing proximity measures m = 1;2 (say,
border contiguity and some critical level of bilateral trade). We would like to know which of these
is closer to the \truth," so as to include it in the SAR model. The conventional approach of spatial
econometrics has been to treat network specication as a variable or model selection problem:
1. Strength of autocorrelation (m). One ts a model for each matrix (W1;W2), examines
whether the respective autocorrelation coecients (1;2) are statistically dierent from what
we would expect by chance, and selects the model where the strength and signicance of the
spatial dependence is greatest. This procedure has a long history in theoretical and applied
work on spatial econometrics. Kooijman (1976) proposed matrix selection by maximization
of the Moran's I autocorrelation coecient, while O'Loughlin and Anselin (1991, 42-44)
selected among multiple connectivity matrices by examining the relative size and signicance
of a general cross-product measure of spatial association.
2. Goodness-of-t diagnostics for non-nested models. One selects a model that mini-
mizes a statistic, like Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC), which balances an analysis of deviance with a penalty for model complexity. Although
9Estimation can be accomplished with maximum likelihood. The SAR model has a full log-likelihood of the form
lnL =  
n
2
ln(
2) + lnjI   mWmj  

0
22
 = (I   mWm)
 1y   X
6log-likelihood and similar diagnostics are general model selection tools, spatial econometri-
cians have also recommended their use as criteria for the selection of spatial weight matrices
(Anselin, 2002; Lee, 2009).
3. Cross-validation. Each model is estimated { repeatedly { on a random subset of data,
and its predictive performance is evaluated on previously unseen out-of-sample data. This
procedure is a popular check against overtting in a wide class of models (Ward et al., 2010),
and is occassionally applied to the selection of connectivity criteria in spatial econometrics
(Ertur et al., 2007).
Beyond these three, a range of other procedures has been proposed by spatial econometricians,
such as estimating spatial weights matrices based on an observed pattern of spatial dependence
(Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler, 2005), Bayesian model comparison (Holloway and Lapar, 2007),
Bayesian model averaging (LeSage and Parent, 2007) and component-wise boosting algorithms
(Kostov, 2010). Because most of these procedures are restricted to highly specialized classes of
spatial models, we limit our attention to the three more general selection approaches listed here.
To assess the relative performance of these procedures in addressing the CNP, we performed
a series of Monte Carlo experiments in which models were estimated using 1,000 random graphs,
each with a dierent degree of structural similarity to the one \true" network of diusion. The
true network (C, row normalized as W) was assumed to be the most commonly-used measure in
international relations: border contiguity. The data generating process was based on the SAR model
as dened in (2): the X matrix included an intercept term and a normally-distributed random
variable, the  vector consisted of the arbitrary coecients [:01 4], and the true autoregressive
parameter  was evaluated at an arbitrary value of .1, indicating weak positive autocorrelation.
Based on our knowledge of the \true" network, we generated 1,000 random graphs with varying
degrees of structural similarity to W. To determine the degree of conict or agreement between
the competing proximity measures, we relied on an edge-set comparison diagnostic called graph
correlation (Krackhardt, 1987, 1988; Butts and Carley, 2001, 2005).10 Each full set of connectivities
(the matrix Cm) was treated as a random variable, given that each matrix was built on the same set
of objects (countries), and that the dimensions and ordering of rows and columns were identical.11
For each Cm, we began by calculating the graph mean, m, understood as the expectation of a
uniform draw from the matrix. For the binary connectivity matrices considered here, m could be
interpreted as the graph's density, or proportion of existing connections relative to the total number
possible, n(n   1)=2. With this information, we calculated the covariance between two graphs C1
10While alternative techniques have been proposed for this purpose { e.g. graph-level indices, algebraic and
model-based methods { a direct comparison of the full sets of pairwise connections, or edges, enables us to evaluate
correspondence between structures more eciently and with no parametric assumptions.
11For the more complicated case where permutations are allowed, see Butts and Carley (2001).
7and C2:
gcov(C1;C2) =
1
n(n   1)
n X
i=1
n 1 X
j=1
 
c1(i;j)   1
 
c2(i;j)   2

(3)
and the variance of each graph, which is simply the covariance of the graph with itself:
gvar(C1) =
1
n(n   1)
n X
i=1
n 1 X
j=1
 
c1(i;j)   1
2 (4)
The graph correlation coecient gcor could then be computed as:
gcor(C1;C2) =
gcov(C1;C2)
p
gvar(C1)gvar(C2)
(5)
Graph correlation has an interpretation analogous to the common Pearson product-moment corre-
lation coecient. In the context of the Conicting Neighbor Problem, a value of -1 indicates that
two graphs are in perfect conict, a value of +1 indicates that they are in perfect agreement. Values
between these extremes indicate partial conict (-1,0) or partial agreement (0,1).
For each of the m 2 f1;:::;1000g random graphs Cm, with gcor(C;Cm) 2 ( 1;1), we row-
normalized the matrix to create Wm, t the model in (1) using maximum likelihood, and recorded
the autocorrelation parameter estimate (^ m), its standard error (SE[^ m]), and the model's AIC and
BIC statistics. We also performed repeated random sub-sampling cross-validation, and reported
the mean RMSE and 95% condence interval for each of the 1,000 graphs.12 Figure 1
The results of the Monte Carlo study are shown in Figure 1. The horizontal axis in each plot
displays the graph correlation of each Cm with the true matrix C. The vertical axes report statis-
tics corresponding to the three model selection criteria of statistical signicance, goodness-of-t
and cross-validation: [1a] spatial autocorrelation parameter estimates (points) and 95% condence
intervals (grey lines), relative to 0 (dashed line) and the true value (red line), [1b] AIC statistics
(points), and [1c] out-of-sample RMSE means (points) and 95% condence intervals (grey lines).
1. Strength of autocorrelation. As shown in Figure 1a, the autocorrelation estimate ^ 
converges to the true value ( = :1) as gcor approaches 1. If one were to select a model based
exclusively on the the size and signicance of the coecient, however, a graph in perfect
conict (gcor =  1) would be as likely a choice as one in perfect agreement (gcor = 1).
12For each of the 1,000 graphs, we calculated the spatially lagged dependent variable using Wm, randomly selected
90% of the data into a training set and 10% into a validation set, and ran a SAR model on the training data. We
then used the model's parameters to calculate predicted values for the validation set and recorded the root mean
squared error (RMSE) for these out-of-sample predictions. We repeated this procedure with 100 random partitions
of the data and averaged RMSE statistics over these 100 runs.
8Due to an inability to distinguish between conict and agreement, the signicance criterion
does little to avert the risk of mistaking diusion for repellence { a Type \S" error, in the
terminology of Gelman and Tuerlinckx (2000). If the candidate network is misspecied such
that it has only negligible overlap with the true graph (gcor is close to 0), condence intervals
cover the origin and Type II errors become likely.
2. Goodness-of-t. As shown in Figure 1b, information criteria like AIC and BIC do a far
better job of adjudicating between graphs positively and negatively correlated with the true
network.13 However, this advantage is most profound only in cases of near-perfect agreement,
where gcor > :8. Elsewhere, as in cases of partial and perfect conict, the relationship
between graph correlation and AIC is concave. While a graph with gcor = :6 is more likely
to be selected than one with gcor = :4, so too would a graph with gcor =  :6, even though
the gcor = :4 graph is in fact closer to the \truth".
3. Cross-validation. As shown in Figure 1c, out-of-sample prediction diagnostics also exhibit a
concave relationship with graph correlation. Like AIC, RMSE performs quite well for graphs
in near-perfect agreement with the true network: a graph with gcor = :99 predicts outcomes
in out-of-sample data with considerably greater accuracy than a graph with gcor =  :99. For
most graphs in the middle, however, higher prediction accuracy is an indication of the scale
of correlation with the true network, not the direction of that correlation.
Assuming that researchers have an interest in the substantive meaning of spatial dependence, in
addition to its mere presence or absence, there is a point at which the utility of model t diagnostics
ends and the importance of theory begins. The ambiguity of the three diagnostics lies in the fact
that { outside of extreme cases { none of them can eectively eliminate the risk of Type \S" error.
Since diusion implies positive spatial autocorrelation, however, we can potentially impose a strong
prior on the sign of m, restricting our search to the sections of Figure 1 where gcor  0. Since
model t and cross-validation statistics are monotonic in this region, the model selection exercise
would be vastly simplied.
4 A Three-Step Procedure
We propose a simple procedure to choose among multiple sets of neighbors:
First step: Network specication. Dene the set of plausible networks for a given set of units.
For each network, dene (1) the space the objects occupy, (2) the measure of distance be-
tween them and (3) the connectivity criterion used to distinguish between neighbors and
non-neighbors.
13Because the number of parameters was the same across the 1,000 models, AIC and BIC results were almost
identical. For this reason, only the former are reported in Figure 1.
9Second step: Diagnostics. Examine pairwise correlations between the graphs. If any of the
correlations are negative, use a theoretically-informed prior about the direction of spatial
dependence to reduce the set of graphs to only those positively correlated with each other.
Estimate the model with each graph. Use a combination of parameter-level (signicance)
and model-level diagnostics (goodness-of-t, cross-validation) to eliminate candidate graphs
that bear little or no structural resemblance to the true, unobserved network. These include
graphs that produce insignicant autocorrelation parameters, and models with relatively high
deviance statistics and poor predictive performance.
Third step: Simulation. If more than one graph survives the second step, use simulation to
illustrate the empirical implications of the best-performing theories. This involves the disag-
gregation of diusion eects into specic counterfactual predictions of the sort: \If a change
occurs in unit i, how will it inuence some outcome in unit j given network structure m?"
Each of the three steps is guided by theoretical considerations { about the universe of graphs
to be considered, about the direction of dependence and the specication of the diusion model
itself, about the counterfactual scenario to be simulated. This procedure is illustrated below for a
famous empirical example from international relations: the spread of democracy. The Conicting
Neighbor Problem here lies in the uncertainty of the network through which political regime change
can spread, and the structural overlap between candidate networks, which include several common
geographic and non-geographic measures of proximity.
5 Application: The Spread of Democracy
In \Diusion and the International Context of Democratization," Kristian Gleditsch and Michael
Ward argue that international factors can exert a strong inuence on the prospects and durability of
transitions to democracy (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). Pointing to patterns of geographic clustering
in the global distribution of democratic regimes and transitions to democracy, the authors argue
that democratic regimes are more likely to emerge and endure in regions with a high proportion of
neighboring democratic states, and that regime transitions tend to impart a regional convergence.14
The magnitude of democratic \spillover eects", however, may be highly dependent on one's
choice of network. Specically, what signal needs to be transmitted for the diusion of democracy
to take place, and what are the pathways through which the signal is likely to travel? The authors
write, \one can think of diusion in terms of how linkages to external actors and events inuence
the relative power and the likely strategies and choices of relevant groups in struggles over political
institutions and outcomes" (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006, 918). By this statement, the signal that
must be transmitted appears to be information { about the utility of various political institutions,
14Background on the Gleditsch and Ward (2006) model is provided in the Appendix.
10about the costs, benets or perceived probability of regime change, about successful or failed
strategies for political reform. The authors capture this process with a network of geographically
contiguous states. As we demonstrate below, however, these signals can conceivably be transmitted
through a number of dierent pathways.
Step 1: Enumeration of Network Specications
As a rst step in our reanalysis, we begin by specifying the set of networks to be considered as
potential pathways of diusion. Because categories of international networks are quite broad and
encompass a wide variety of possibilities, we limit our survey to six distance metrics dened on
geographic and nongeographic space: [1] interborder distance, [2] intercapital distance, [3] ethnic
ties, [4] bilateral trade, [5] intergovernmental organizations, and [6] military alliances. An overview
of their formal denitions and substantive assumptions is provided below.
1. Interborder distance (geographic space). Let Bi be the set of boundary points on polygon
i (i.e. the political borders of a country), and let bi be an element of Bi (i.e. the coordinates
of a single boundary point). Similarly for Bj. The interborder distance between i and j is
dened as the minimum distance between all pairs of boundary points on each polygon:
d(i;j) = min
bi2Bi;bj2Bi
d(bi;bj)
Assuming that a signal can be transmitted by cross-border movements of people and goods,
a shorter distance between the political borders of two countries is expected to reduce the
costs of transmission. This is the metric used by Gleditsch and Ward (2006) in their original
analysis.
2. Intercapital distance (geographic space). Let (xi;yi) be the Cartesian coordinates of the
capital city of country i. Similarly for (xj;yj). The intercapital distance between i and j is
dened as the Euclidean distance between these points:
d(i;j) =
q
(xj   xi)2 + (yj   yi)2
Assuming that a signal can be transmitted by ocial travel and political communication, a
shorter distance between the political capitals of two countries is expected to reduce the costs
of transmission (Lee and Strang, 2006; Bach and Newman, 2010).
3. Ethnic proximity (nongeographic space). Let Ei be the set of unique ethnolinguistic groups
residing within the borders of country i. Similarly for Ej. The ethnic proximity between i
11and j is dened as the number of shared groups that reside within both countries:
p(i;j) = jEi \ Ejj
If two countries are home to related ethnic or linguistic groups, these ethnic and cultural ties
can facilitate the ow of information through common media markets, interpersonal contacts,
or cognitive shortcuts on the appropriateness of a particular political system given a set of
shared values (Simmons and Elkins, 2004).
4. Trade proximity (nongeographic space). Let (i;j) be the volume of exports from country
i to country j and let (j;i) be the volume of imports to i from j. The trade proximity
between i and j is dened as the sum of these two quantities:
p(i;j) = (i;j) + (j;i)
If two countries are major trading partners, information may ow through the exchange of
consumer goods or through interpersonal contacts among business elites (Greenhill et al.,
2009). Additionally, trade relations may make countries more responsive to human rights
concerns, labor standards and other norms of behavior, particularly if such expectations are
backed by the possibility of positive or negative trade sanctions.
5. Intergovernmental proximity (nongeographic space). Let Ii be the set of intergovern-
mental organizations (IGOs) in which country i formally participates. Similarly for Ij. The
intergovernmental proximity between i and j is dened as the number of IGOs in which the
two countries jointly participate:
p(i;j) = jIi \ Ijj
If two countries are members of the same intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), regular-
ized contacts between political, government or military elites may provide opportunities for
international socialization, where states observe and mimic the actions of others, dening
and internalizing the norms of behavior condoned by the larger group (Cao, 2009; Greenhill,
2010).
6. Alliance proximity (nongeographic space). Let Ai be the set of collective or mutual defense
treaties of which country i is a signatory. Similarly for Aj. The alliance proximity between i
and j is dened as the number of alliances involving both countries:
p(i;j) = jAi \ Ajj
Like IGOs, alliances provide a forum for elite socialization { through common military stan-
12dards, training, doctrines, weapons systems and missions (Hammarstrom and Heldt, 2002).
Unlike many IGOs, alliances are typically smaller, more exclusive communities, with more
robust means to monitor compliance and punish those who deviate, as evidenced by the
Warsaw Pact's interventions to prevent democratic liberalization in Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
One reason for the popularity of geographical distances in IR research is the assumption that ex-
ogeneity is automatically ensured: the physical locations of cities and borders are relatively static
and often causally prior to the diusion process under consideration (Kostov, 2010). The same
cannot always be said of nongeographic space. The endogeneity of international regimes and insti-
tutions has been the focus of a vast body of research (Keohane, 1988; Simmons and Martin, 2001),
as have problems of homophily and endogeneity in network formation more broadly (McPherson
et al., 2001; Shalizi and Thomas, 2011). Although great care should always be taken in drawing
causal inferences from models based on nongeographic measures of distance and proximity { and
an adequate treatment of their identication lies outside the scope of our paper { there are equally
compelling reasons to include these metrics in our survey.
First, the two types of space often overlap. Intergovernmental organizations and alliances are
often regional in focus; trade is less costly when conducted between geographic neighbors; ethnic
groups cluster geographically. While justications for network specications are rarely explicit, the
prominence of border contiguity in IR is unlikely due to the plausibility of the assumption that
politically-relevant information can only be transmitted by cross-border movements. Intentionally
or not, our interpretation of geographical space is already imbued with political meaning. If we
insist on maintaining a conceptual separation between geographic and nongeographic space, the
structural distinctions between these two classes of networks should be measured rather than as-
sumed.
Second, the current direction of diusion research dictates that model comparisons be carried
out across, rather than just within particular types of topological space. While some studies are
more careful about identication challenges than others, scholars are increasingly moving past ge-
ography to indicators of actual political, cultural and economic communication (Beck et al., 2006;
Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Greenhill et al., 2009; Cao, 2010; Greenhill, 2010). The increasing atten-
tion on nongeographic space stems from its relatively direct theoretical appeal. Such relationships
are substantively easier to relate to some of the mechanisms associated with certain types of dif-
fusion: if we are interested in modeling the adoption of common military technology and doctrine,
joint membership in a military alliance may seem a more suitable choice than shared borders. A
systematic examination of other types of space is an eort to let theory to drive our measurement
choices and not the other way around.
The challenge that remains is one of comparability: each metric is distributed and scaled in a
dierent way, making direct comparisons dicult. While some relationships, like border contigu-
13ity and military alliances, are directly translatable into connectivities, others are continuous (e.g.
capital-to-capital distance, trade ows) or cumulative (e.g. number of shared ethnic groups, or
the number of intergovernmental organizations in which two countries jointly participate). In the
latter case, pairwise connections are not immediately apparent from the raw data. After all, how
much bilateral trade makes two states \signicant trade partners"? Connectivity criteria provide a
consistent way to relate these metrics to discrete denitions of \neighborhood", provided that the
resulting binary graphs reect a quantity of theoretical interest and approximate the geometry of
the continuous case.15 We consider four connectivity criteria below:
1. Thresholding. Let r be a search radius dened on space S. Countries i and j are considered
neighbors if they are located within r spatial units of each other.
cTHRES(i;j) = 1fi;j 2 S : d(i;j)  rg (distance)
= 1fi;j 2 S : p(i;j)  rg (proximity)
The simplest connectivity criterion imposes some theoretically meaningful threshold value on the
distance or proximity metric under consideration. The advantage of thresholding lies in its sim-
plicity and interpretability. The disadvantage is that the choice of r is at once arbitrary and highly
consequential, particularly where the distribution of objects in space is not uniform: a 500 km
threshold on interborder distance { the criterion used by Gleditsch and Ward (2006) { means a
quite dierent thing in Oceania than in Central Europe. An overly conservative radius can create
a high proportion of neighborless isolates, while an overly expansive one can create a high number
of politically irrelevant connections. This trade-o entails a host of theoretical and computational
concerns (Bivand et al., 2008).
2. Minimum distance. Let r = maxn
i=1minn 1
j6=i d(i;j) be the maximum rst nearest neighbor
distance between all pairs of objects in space S. Countries i and j are considered neighbors
if they are located within r spatial units of each other.
cMDN(i;j) = 1fi;j 2 S : d(i;j) 
n
max
i=1
n 1
min
i6=j
d(i;j)g (distance)
= 1fi;j 2 S : p(i;j) 
n
min
i=1
n 1
max
i6=j
p(i;j)g (proximity)
15A number of conventions have been proposed for optimal threshold selection for valued ties, including rank
discrepancy minimization and simulation (Thomas and Blitzstein, 2009b). Since any dichotomization can result in a
considerable loss of information, the alternative might be to avoid thresholding altogether, treat all nonzero pairs as
neighbors, and settle on a continuous measure of connectivity like inverse network distance, frequency or bandwidth.
Due to the high density of resulting matrices, this approach might itself entail some of computational and theoretical
problems. For our purposes, dichotomization also oers the benets of consistency and simplicity in measurement,
modeling, inference and prediction.
14An extreme solution to the \island" problem is the use of minimum distance connectivities, a special
case of thresholding that ensures that the most isolated object in the system will have at least one
neighbor and the rest will have as many neighbors as can be found within the corresponding search
radius. The advantage of minimum distance is that it eliminates the neighborless unit problem
encountered with arbitrary threshold specications. However, it is highly inecient for irregularly-
spaced units { of which countries in the international system are an example. In regions with a
high density of units, such as Central Europe and much of West Africa, an excessive number of
connections results in a high noise-to-signal ratio.
3. k-nearest neighbor. Let d(1)(i; )    d(n)(i; ) be the order statistics for the distances
between point i and all other points in the set f1;:::;ng, and let p(1)(i; )    p(n)(i; )
be the order statistics for the proximities. Countries i and j are considered neighbors if j is
one of the k nearest neighbors of i.
cKNN(i;j) = 1fi;j 2 S : d(i;j)  d(k)(i; )g (distance)
= 1fi;j 2 S : p(i;j)  p(k)(i; )g (proximity)
Another variety of threshold-based criteria, the k-nearest neighbor criterion takes into account
dierences in the densities of areal units, ensuring that all observations have the same number of
incoming ties, while avoiding much of the noise associated with minimum distance measures. One
drawback is that k nearest neighbor methods produce a potentially high number of asymmetric
connectivities (country i is a neighbor of country j but not vice-versa), which may or may not
be problematic, depending on the nature of the phenomenon under study. More crucially, the
selection of k may not reect the \true" level of a unit's isolation or connectedness, since the
number of neighbors is uniform across the system.16
3. Sphere of Inuence. Let Oi be a circle centered at point i, with radius ri = mind(i; ),
that point's rst nearest neighbor distance. Let Oi \ Oj be the intersection between circles
Oi and Oj. Objects i and j could thus be considered sphere of inuence neighbors whenever
Oi and Oj intersect in exactly two points (Avis and Horton, 1985, 323): Figure 2
cSOI(i;j) = 1fi;j 2 S : Oi \ Oj 6= ;g (Cartesian coordinate system)
As illustrated in Figure 2, the sphere of inuence graph requires information on the relative
placement of nodes on a geographic or planar coordinate system. For a more general case, we
may reach a naive approximation with a pseudo sphere of inuence criterion, which relies on
16This setup is similar to the \name k friends" procedure in social network data collection, which truncates the
sample space of the family of networks and has been shown to introduce bias into the estimation of autocorrelation
and network eects (Thomas and Blitzstein, 2009a).
15the symmetrization of a k = 1 nearest neighbor matrix. Two countries i and j are considered
neighbors if either j is the rst nearest neighbor of i or vice versa:
cpSOI(i;j) = 1fi;j 2 S : d(i;j) = d(1)(i; ) [ d(j;i) = d(1)(j; )g (general distance)
= 1fi;j 2 S : p(i;j) = p(1)(i; ) [ p(j;i) = p(1)(j; )g (general proximity)
Like k nearest neighbor, the sphere of inuence graph ensures that all units have at least one
neighbor and produces a far sparser matrix than the more noisy minimum distance specication.
This approach is well-suited for irregularly-located areal entities: the method does not require a
user-dened parameter like r or k, the number of connections per unit is variable and relatively long
links are avoided. The disadvantage is that inferences made from sphere of inuence neighbors are
not as immediately intuitive as in the rst three approaches. In international relations, (pseudo)
sphere of inuence neighbors tend to assume relatively few connections per country.
Step 2: Structural Comparisons and Model Diagnostics
Once the list of candidate graphs is enumerated, we may proceed to construct connectivity matrices
based on real data, and assess the degree of overlap between the specications. To facilitate the
estimation of geographic networks for all country years between 1875 and 1998, we created a sep-
arate ESRI shapele (polygon-based digital map) for each year of observation, to account for the
numerous boundary changes, partitions and unications that have taken place over the course of
the period of observation.17 To facilitate estimation of the non-geographic networks for each year,
we constructed graphs from several dyadic panel datasets, including the Correlates of War Dyadic
Trade, (Barbieri and Pollins, 2009), Intergovernmental Organization (Pevehouse and Warnke, 2004)
and Alliance (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004) datasets. To construct the ethnic network, we joined our
historical state borders data with the Geo-Referencing of Ethnic Groups (Weidmann et al., 2010)
polygons, and computed the number of shared ethnic groups residing within the borders of each
pair of countries.18
Figure 3 shows the full set of graphs derived from these specications. Simple threshold-
ing was used for two metrics. For interborder distance, we kept Gleditsch and Ward (2006)'s
value of 500 km as the distance separating the nearest border points of neighboring countries:
17For a summary of the major changes, see Gleditsch and Ward (2001, 16-17). Since the earlier years in the dataset
contain many fewer cross-sectional observations than more recent years, dependencies and other non-self governing
entities were treated as missing data prior to the year of their independence. The resulting shapeles were then joined
with Gleditsch and Ward (2006) data, and were used as base maps for the estimation of unique weights matrices for
each calendar year. Weidmann et al. (2010) have recently made available the excellent CShapes historical boundary
data available in R and ESRI formats.
18Unlike the Correlates of War data, which is measured at the level of dyad-year, the GREG ethnicity dataset is
based on ethnic boundaries from a single cross-section from the widely-used Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira (1964). While
the ethnic network is nonetheless dynamic, all variation across time is due to changes of state borders, rather than
changes in settlement patterns { the latter of which are assumed constant (Weidmann et al., 2010).
16cCONT(i;j) = 1fi;j 2 S : mind(bi;bj) < 500g. For alliance proximity, we assumed that the exis-
tence of even one mutual defense pact was a sucient threshold to classify two countries as allies:
cALLY (i;j) = 1fi;j 2 S : jAi \Ajj > 0g. For all other metrics, we applied the criteria of minimum
distance, k = 4 nearest neighbors, and sphere of inuence. The densest graphs were produced by
the minimum distance criterion, designed to ensure that each country has at least one neighbor.
The sparsest graphs were produced by sphere of inuence, which restricted the search only to the
immediate vicinity of each country. k = 4 nearest neighbors produced some quite asymmetrical
connectivities: while each country had at least four neighbors (incoming ties), there were no re-
strictions on how many times a country could be a neighbor to others (outgoing ties). Figure 3
What is the degree of structural similarity between these measures? Figure 4 shows a graph cor-
relation matrix for the fourteen graphs dened above.19 Almost all graphs are in partial agreement
with each other. The strongest positive correlations are those between { and within { geographic
and ethnic ties. Gleditsch and Ward (2006)'s original measure of border contiguity is strongly
correlated with the k = 4 nearest neighbor specication of intercapital distance and minimum
distance ethnic neighbors (gcor > 6). Trade, meanwhile, is only weakly correlated with other
specications, suggesting that patterns of international commerce are not constrained by the limits
of geographic and ethnic proximity. Intergovernmental and alliance ties exhibit low-to-moderate
overlap with geographic and ethnic ties and little overlap with trade. Only one graph { IGOMDN
{ is in partial conict (negatively correlated) with any other, a likely artifact of the density of the
matrix as shown on Figure 3. Due to this conict, we would expect the graph to yield dierent
autocorrelation estimates from the alternatives { perhaps estimating repellence where the other
graphs estimate diusion. Figure 4
Once the new sets of connectivity matrices were created, we adopted the same spatial weights
(competitive and cumulative) to re-code the two spatial variables used in Gleditsch and Ward
(2006): proportion of neighboring democracies and neighboring transitions to democracy, as de-
ned in the Appendix. The yearly cross-sections were then remerged into a full dataset, spanning
1875-1998.20 To contrast the authors' original ndings with those produced by alternative deni-
tions of the \local context," we reanalyzed their models with the fourteen connectivity specications
shown in Figure 3.
To nd the most plausible graph (and model) given the observed data and theory specied by
Gleditsch and Ward (2006), we begin by separating promising candidate graphs from those that
bear little or no structural resemblance to the true, unobserved network. Figure 5 shows a series of
parameter-level and model-level diagnostics that serve this purpose. These diagnostics suggest that
19Although geographic and network data for all years (1875-1998) were used in the models, only 1998 data are
shown in Figure 4.
20While the contiguity measure is exactly the same as the one used by Gleditsch and Ward (2006) the results dier
due to a typo in the specication of the original model. The result is that neighboring transition to democracy is
allowed to enter the model when the country is either a democracy or an autocracy in the previous period. The
results presented here reect the corrected model.
17the spatial structure implied by connectivity assumptions can profoundly change inferences about
the process of diusion. While ethnicity and trade are weak, even negligible, carries of democracy,
alliances and international institutions can provide pathways at least as compelling as geography.
To evaluate the strength and signicance of the diusion process itself, we asked the following
counterfactual question: would a median autocratic state be more likely to democratize if its neigh-
bors were more democratic? For each model, we simulated the eect of a one standard-deviation
increase in the proportion of neighboring democratic states on the relevant transition probability,
autocracy to democracy (A ! D). As shown in Figure 5a, the magnitude, direction and estimation
certainty of the neighborhood eect vary considerably by connectivity type. Although { in most
cases { a more democratic neighborhood is associated with a higher probability of democratic regime
change, this eect is signicantly dierent from zero under just three of the measures: intercapital
distance (GEOKNN4), intergovernmental organizations (IGOKNN4) and alliance ties (Alliance).
With all other networks, including the one originally specied by the authors (GEOCONT), the
eect is positive but insignicant. Only for IGOMDN { the graph in partial conict with other
candidates in Figure 4 { is the eect negative, though insignicant.
Figure 5b reports model-level goodness-of-t statistics (AIC) for all measures. Although the
number of parameters is the same across the fourteen models and none can be penalized for its rela-
tive complexity, deviance statistics indeed vary across the dierent specications. Not surprisingly,
the best-performing models are ones in which the estimated diusion eect is strongest: intercapital
distance (GEOKNN4), intergovernmental organizations (IGOKNN4) and alliance ties (Alliance).
The same pattern holds when the models are subjected to cross validation tests. Following
Ward et al. (2010), we repeated the following procedure 100 times for each of the fourteen mea-
sures: randomly partition the data into a training set (90%) and validation set (10%), estimate
Model 3 from Gleditsch and Ward (2006) on the training set, evaluate out-of-sample prediction
accuracy by calculating the area under the receiver-operator curve (AUC) on the validation data.
The average out-of-sample AUC and 95% condence intervals for the 100 runs of each model are
reported in Figure 5c. Prediction accuracy is highest (AUC > :99, with narrow condence inter-
vals) for alliance ties and intergovernmental organizations, followed by intercapital distance.
These diagnostics consistently point to the same decision: we can safely eliminate all candi-
date graphs, save intercapital distance (GEOKNN4), intergovernmental organizations (IGOKNN4)
and alliance ties (Alliance). Of the three nalists, military alliance networks oer the strongest
transmission channels for the spread of democracy (Figure 5a), the best-tting statistical model
(Figure 5b), the most accurate out-of-sample predictions (Figure 5c), and are not negatively corre-
lated with alternative specications (Figure 4). Although the \true" network structure that enables
regime change to spread remains uncertain, we have ample evidence that { of the candidates con-
sidered { alliances provide the closest approximation.
Beyond statistical and predictive power, a no less important consideration is the theoretical nar-
18rative implied by each proximity measure. To investigate the empirical implications of the theory
behind each of the three specications, we conducted a simulation study of the 2011 Arab Spring. Figure 5
Step 3: Simulation of the 2011 Arab Spring
The cascade of popular protests and uprisings that began to grip the Arab world in December
2010 has spawned renewed academic and public debate about the potential spread of revolutionary
change. Two positions have emerged on the topic. The rst expects the demonstration eect
of events in Tunisia and Egypt to spark a wave of political change across the Middle East and
other regions dominated by long-serving autocratic leaders (Lynch, 2011; Smith et al., 2011). The
second view is more skeptical, and expects the probability of regime change to be driven less by
contagion and more by exogenous factors like food price shocks and the idiosyncrasies of political
institutions in individual states (Walt, 2011b,a). The diering expectations of the virulence and
transmissibility of these revolutions stem in part from dierent views of the networks by which
regime change is likely to spread. In addition to Gleditsch and Ward (2006)'s contention that this
process is facilitated by cross-border movements (GEOCONT), our analysis of alternatives in Step
2 has identied three other theoretical pathways as likely given the data: political communication
between capital cities (GEOKNN4), socialization of elites through intergovernmental organizations
(IGOKNN4), and military alliances (Alliance). Each network potentially yields a dierent set of
predictions about the strength and extent of revolutionary spread.
Although the ultimate outcomes of political reforms in Tunisia and Egypt remain uncertain at
the time of writing, the Arab Spring oers a tting opportunity to apply the democratic diusion
model to a specic case. As a hypothetical scenario, we will assume that Tunisia and Egypt
complete their transitions to a consolidated democracy { dened by the Polity IV characteristics
of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition (Jaggers
and Gurr, 1995). We may illustrate how our theories expect this event to resonate by answering
the following question: If a democratic transition takes place in country i, what is the change in
predicted probability of a democratic transition in country j (country i's neighbor) given network
specication m? This statistic is called the equilibrium eect of a democratic transition, or formally:
Pr(yj;tjyi;t = yi;t 1;Cm)   Pr(yj;tjyi;t 6= yi;t 1;Cm)
where yi;t = 0 if country i is a democracy at time t, yi;t = 1 if it is an autocracy, and Cm is the
graph associated with theory m. All other covariates are held at their observed values. Figure 6
Figure 6 shows predicted changes in probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy,
given the establishment of democratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt.21 Positive changes in proba-
bility indicate that regimes become more unstable and thus more likely to democratize. Only sta-
21Colors represent average changes in predicted transition probability after 1,000 simulations.
19tistically signicant changes in probability are reported; where the 95% condence interval around
an equilibrium eect covers zero, the eect is not visualized. Table 1
The general nding from these simulations is that democratic regime change in Tunisia and
Egypt increases the probability of regime transitions in neighboring autocratic states. Each set of
connectivities, however, conveys a slightly dierent story. With Gleditsch and Ward (2006)'s geo-
graphic contiguity neighbors, the eect reaches eight countries: Algeria, Chad, Jordan, Lebanon,
Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Syria. The greatest change (+.09) takes place in Libya due to that
country's direct contiguity to both Egypt and Tunisia. Democratic regime change in these coun-
tries raises the proportion of democracies in Libya's neighborhood (Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Greece,
Italy, Niger, Sudan, Tunisia) from one quarter to one half. If shared borders facilitate the ow of
information about democratic reforms, it will be dicult for Libya to insulate itself from changes
next door. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, experiences the lowest change in probability (+0.027) due to
the Kingdom's relative isolation from revolutionary events. Of the two democratizing countries,
only Egypt is suciently proximate to exert a direct impact on Saudi domestic politics. Of the
seventeen countries that share a border with Saudi Arabia or lie within 500 km of one, democracies
remain a small minority: Egypt, Israel and Turkey, against fourteen non-democratic states.
Inter-capital distance (k = 4 nearest neighbors) indicates a sharper, but more geographically
narrow impact. The probability of democratization rises in three North African countries: Algeria
(+.06), Libya (+.07) and Morocco (+.06). No countries east of Egypt are aected by the Arab
Spring due in part to the asymmetrical logic of k-nearest neighbors. While each state has four in-
coming ties (closest neighbors of country i), the number of outgoing ties is variable (countries that
count i among their closest neighbors). Due to the high density of capital cities east of the Sinai
peninsula, not a single Middle Eastern state counts Egypt among its four closest neighbors. Nicosia,
Jerusalem, Beirut and Damascus are all closer to Amman than Cairo is, just as Baghdad, Kuwait
City, Doha and Abu Dhabi are all closer to Riyadh. As a result, Egypt's democratic shift seemingly
occurs in a vacuum, without any regional eect. Tunisia, by contrast, has a much stronger impact.
It is an intercapital neighbor to four countries (Algeria, Italy, Libya and Morocco), three of which
are autocracies where the neighborhood shock is directly felt.
Connections through intergovernmental organizations imply a broader and more varied regional
impact. Because the nearest neighbor relation is not a symmetric one, many relationships are not
reciprocated. Unlike in the inter-capital distance case, however, the IGOKNN4 denition assigns a
far more central role to Egypt and Tunisia due to their levels of activity in international organiza-
tions. Seventeen countries count Egypt among the four states with which they co-participate the
most in IGO's, and eleven countries list Tunisia among their top four. The eect is strongest in
the countries directly connected to both newly-democratic regimes, such as Yemen (+.14), Algeria
(+.13), Sudan (+.12) and Syria(+.11). It is weaker in Saudi Arabia (+.05), which is connected
only to Egypt, and Mauritania (+.05), which is connected only to Tunisia.
20Alliance relationships predict that democratization in Tunisia and Egypt will have a more even,
but relatively diuse eect on the region. Both countries enjoy alliance ties with the same sixteen
states { Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. Unlike in the nearest
neighbor specication, alliance ties are all reciprocated. Because of the dense-but-symmetric na-
ture of the alliance network, the regional impact of the Arab Spring scenario is relatively small on
average, with little variance { the increase in probability of democratization ranges between +.04
and +.05 for all neighbors.
What networks provide the most ecient channels for the Arab Spring to spread? Given the
history of democratization since 1875, three specications have shown themselves to be the most
likely pathways of democratic diusion: intercapital distance (k = 4 nearest neighbors), joint par-
ticipation in IGO's (k = 4 nearest neighbors) and alliance relationships. Compared with border
contiguity { the original choice of Gleditsch and Ward (2006) { these specications yield stronger
and more signicant diusion eects, tighter model t and more accurate out-of-sample predictions.
They also produce noticeably dierent forecasts of how democracy is likely to spread through the
Arab world. In the least-likely scenario that democratic signals are transmitted by cross-border
movement, transitions in Tunisia and Egypt are predicted to have the strongest impact on Libya
and a more muted eect on other countries in the region. If democratic signals are transmitted by
political communication between capital cities, the regional eect is predicted to be sharper but
geographically conned to North Africa. If we accept the narrative that diusion occurs through
international socialization, the Arab Spring is predicted to have a broad destabilizing impact on
autocratic regimes in the region, particularly where intergovernmental ties with Tunisia and Egypt
are multifaceted and robust { like Yemen and Algeria. Finally, in the statistically most-likely case
that democratization spreads through alliance ties, the predicted changes are more conservative in
size but rather broad in geographical scope.
6 Conclusion
Diusion is the study of how a phenomenon spreads, across time and space, from a point of origin
to proximate locations. In modeling this process, we must specify a structure of spatial interde-
pendence. The \true" network of diusion, however, is typically unobserved and the choice we
make will not necessarily correspond to reality. The space between objects may be geographic or
non-geographic, and the signals transmitted may be physical (e.g. refugees, weapons, migrants)
or more intangible (e.g. norms, policies). These networks may overlap to varying degrees, and it
can be dicult to assess which measures are structurally closest to the \true" connective topology.
In this paper, we oer a more systematic overview of the assumptions behind these choices, and
propose a procedure to adjudicate between them.
Rather than to select an arbitrary network specication ex ante (the current norm), our pre-
21scription relies on a theoretically-informed enumeration of multiple candidates, followed by an ex
post evaluation of their structural similarity and relative statistical and predictive performance. We
stress that, while statistical screening can help eliminate poor choices, theoretical screening should
arbitrate between good ones. Using a famous model of democratic diusion, we illustrate how
disaggregated simulation and counterfactual analysis can be used to unpack the empirical implica-
tions of alternative theoretical narratives in the case of the 2011 Arab Spring. While alliance and
intergovernmental ties outperformed geographic ones in our analysis, we sought to provide enough
information for the reader to make their own choice.
Spatial analysis is rapidly growing in prominence in political science. At the same time, models
are becoming increasingly sophisticated to adapt to quantities of particular interest to political sci-
ence.22 In all uses of spatial variables, from simple controls to more complex models of contagion,
we should not leave unchallenged basic assumptions about who these neighbors are and how they
aect each other.
Appendix: Gleditsch and Ward's empirical model
Gleditsch and Ward (2006) examine changes of political regime as a rst-order Markov chain process
with the transition matrix
K =
 
Pr(yi;t = 0jyi;t 1 = 0) Pr(yi;t = 1jyi;t 1 = 0)
Pr(yi;t = 0jyi;t 1 = 1) Pr(yi;t = 1jyi;t 1 = 1)
!
=
 
Pr(D ! D) Pr(D ! A)
Pr(A ! D) Pr(A ! A)
!
(6)
where yi;t = 1 if an autocratic regime exists in country i at time t (A), yi;t = 0 if the regime is
democratic (D), and \!" is a symbol indicating a transition from one type of regime to another
between t   1 and t. Conditional transition probabilities are estimated by a probit link:
Pr(yi;t = 1jyi;t 1;xi;t) = [xT
i;t + yi;t 1xT
i;t] (7)
where xi;t is the vector of covariates of interest.23 If yi;t 1 = 0 (democracy), then the marginal
eect of x on Pr(yi;t = 1) (autocracy) is . If yi;t 1 = 1 (autocracy), then the marginal eect is ,
the sum of  and the corresponding  coecient (i.e., the interactive term).24
The authors dene a country's neighborhood through border contiguity, where the connectivity
condition is met if at least one point on the boundary of state j 6= i is either directly contiguous to
22See Franzese and Hays (2008) and Neumayer and Pl umper (2010) for some of the recent, sophisticated spatial
analysis techniques in political science.
23These include (in Model 1) domestic variables such as lagged GDP/capita (natural log), GDP growth, civil war
and years of peace, and regional factors such as the proportion of neighboring democracies, global proportion of
democracies and neighboring transitions to democracy.
24This model choice draws heavily on Przeworski and Limongi (1997), who also examine democratic transitions as
a Markov process and estimate transition probabilities through a probit link, following Amemiya (1985).
22country i, or is located within a radius of 500 km.25 This proximity measure is used to derive two
spatial variables, both of which we re-estimated using several alternative network specications:
1. The proportion of neighboring democracies, coded pnbdemij = wij(1   yj), where wij is an
element of a row-standardized spatial weights matrix W and yj is the same binary autocracy
variable baut for country j, such that j 6= i. This is an example of a competitive spatial
weight, where the row-standardization of W dilutes the eect of any one country as the
number of neighbors increases.26
2. Neighboring transitions to democracy, coded nbtdi;t = 1 if at least one of the neighbors
of country i has undergone a transition from yi = 1 (autocracy) at time t   1 to yi = 0
(democracy) at time t, and nbtdi;t = 0 otherwise. More formally,
nbtdi;t =
(
1 if wijdemtrj;t > 0
0 if wijdemtrj;t = 0
, where demtrj;t =
(
1 if yj;t   yj;t 1 =  1
0 otherwise
This is an example of a cumulative spatial weight. Unlike in the previous variable, where only
the proportion of the neighborhood mattered, each individual country's transition contributes
independently of others' occurring in that time period.
25The authors use boundary-to-boundary distances from the Gleditsch and Ward (2001) Minimum Distance
Dataset. Since most scholars are familiar with the Correlates of War data it is worth contrasting the two data
sources. The Gleditsch and Ward (2001) Minimum Distance data provides the actual distance between states rather
than the coarsened levels of the Correlates of War data. This provides the scholar with the freedom to choose their
own distance thresholds.
26See Pl umper and Neumayer (2010) for a detailed discussion of how row-standardization can inuence model
results.
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Table 1: Arab Spring Simulation: Eect of Democratic Transition in Egypt and Tunisia.
Numbers report increase in probability of a democratic transition in country j at time t, given a
democratic transition in Tunisia and Egypt at time t   1. All other variables are held constant at
their median levels. Statistics are averaged over 1,000 simulations. Only statistically signicant
changes reported (where 95% condence interval does not cover zero).
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Algeria 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.10 0.05
Armenia 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Azerbaijan 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Belarus 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bosnia & Herzegovina 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chad 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
China 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Croatia 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cuba 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Djibouti 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
Egypt 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.02
Ethiopia 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Georgia 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Iran 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
Iraq 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.14 0.04
Cote d'Ivory 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Jordan 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.05
Kazakhstan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kenya 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kuwait 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.05
Lebanon 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.16 0.05
Libya 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
Malaysia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mauritania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04
Morocco 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.04
Niger 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Oman 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
Qatar 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Russia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Saudi Arabia 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
Somalia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04
Sri Lanka 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sudan 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.05
Syria 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.04
Tunisia 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.02
United Arab Emirates 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
Yemen 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00
Eritrea 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Serbia 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
29Figure Captions
Figure 1. Structural Similarity and Model Selection. Plots show results of Monte Carlo
simulation with 1,000 random graphs. Horizontal axes in each plot display the graph correlation
of each graph Cm with the true matrix C. The vertical axes report statistics corresponding to:
[1a] spatial autocorrelation parameter estimates, [1b] AIC statistics, and [1c] out-of-sample RMSE
means.
Figure 2. Sphere of inuence graph. Nodes represent cities, directed edges (radii of circles)
correspond to nearest neighbor distances. Here, city B is the nearest neighbor of city A, B and C
are nearest neighbors of each other, and C is the nearest neighbor of D. Where the circles around
reach city overlap in at least two points, the cities can be considered neighbors. In the current
example, A is a neighbor of B and C but not D, B is a neighbor of A and C, C is a neighbor to
all, D is a neighbor only of C.
Figure 3. Network specications. Green lines indicate the existence of a connection between
each pair of country according to each distance or proximity metric and connectivity criterion.
Figure 4. Structural similarity. Colors correspond to size and direction of graph correlation
statistics for every pair of network specications shown in Figure 3.
Figure 5. Model t diagnostics. Figures show (a) changes in transition probability due to a single
standard deviation increase above the mean in the proportion of neighboring democracies, holding
all other variables at their means, (b) model AIC statistics, and (c) out-of-sample areas under
the ROC curve, averaged over 100 random data partitions. Horizontal lines show 95% condence
intervals. Labels on vertical axis indicate proximity measure used in estimation of each model.
Figure 6. Arab Spring simulation. Average change in transition probability after 1,000 simula-
tions.
30Figures
Figure 1: Structural Similarity and Model Selection. Plots show results of Monte Carlo
simulation with 1,000 random graphs. Horizontal axes in each plot display the graph correlation
of each graph Cm with the true matrix C. The vertical axes report statistics corresponding to:
[1a] spatial autocorrelation parameter estimates, [1b] AIC statistics, and [1c] out-of-sample RMSE
means.
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Figure 2: Sphere of inuence graph. Nodes represent cities, directed edges (radii of circles)
correspond to nearest neighbor distances. Here, city B is the nearest neighbor of city A, B and C
are nearest neighbors of each other, and C is the nearest neighbor of D. Where the circles around
reach city overlap in at least two points, the cities can be considered neighbors. In the current
example, A is a neighbor of B and C but not D, B is a neighbor of A and C, C is a neighbor to
all, D is a neighbor only of C.
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each pair of country according to each distance or proximity metric and connectivity criterion.
32Figure 4: Structural similarity. Colors correspond to size and direction of graph correlation
statistics for every pair of network specications shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 5: Model t diagnostics. Figures show (a) changes in transition probability due to a single
standard deviation increase above the mean in the proportion of neighboring democracies, holding
all other variables at their means, (b) model AIC statistics, and (c) out-of-sample areas under
the ROC curve, averaged over 100 random data partitions. Horizontal lines show 95% condence
intervals. Labels on vertical axis indicate proximity measure used in estimation of each model.
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33Figure 6: Arab Spring simulation. Average change in transition probability after 1,000 simula-
tions.
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